A syntactically correct number-specification may fail to specify any number due to underspecification. For similar reasons, although each sentence in the Yablo sequence is syntactically perfect, none yields a statement with any truth-value. As is true of all members of the Liar family, the sentences in the Yablo sequence are so constructed that the specification of their truth-conditions is vacuous; the Yablo sentences fail to yield statements. The 'revenge' problem is easily defused. The solution to the semantical paradoxes offered here revives the mediaeval cassatio approach, one that largely disappeared due to its incomprehending rejection by influential contemporary writers such as William Shyreswood and Thomas Bradwardine. The diagnosis readily extends to the set-theoretic paradoxes.
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Variations on Fibonacci
The Fibonacci series 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55… . has many beautiful and fascinating properties. It is an infinite series of numbers in which each term is the sum of its two 'strengthened' version of the Liar, consists of an infinite sequence of sentences, each saying of all its successors that they are not true (Yablo 1985; 1993) . I hope to show that there is an interesting connection between the series and the sequence. There is nothing paradoxical about the series, but the sequence is paradoxical, and I want to claim that, once the connection is made, the paradox is swiftly solved. The solution, of course, carries over to simpler and standard versions of the Liar.
Each member of the Fibonacci series 'remembers', and sums, its immediate two predecessors. Series constructed on the same general principle, but with better memories, are invariably less interesting than Fibonacci's original. In the 'total recall' series, where each member sums all of its predecessors, the first two members are identical and any member after that is simply twice its predecessor. One can also have 'soothsayer' or 'forward-looking' variants of Fibonacci. For example, the series in which each member is the sum of its immediate two successors is just the Fibonacci series in reverse.
One way to manufacture an extremely boring variant of Fibonacci is to go Boolean, using a binary arithmetic in which addition ('+') is defined by the following matrix: is an infinite repetition of a three-digit pattern.
From arithmetic to logic
Let us represent the classical truth-values 'true' and 'false' by the binary digits '0' and '1'
respectively. Then val (~p) = 1 -val (p) , and classical disjunction translates as Boolean multiplication, val (p v q) = val (p) x val (q). All of the classical truth-functional connectives can be interpreted as Boolean functions. Since classical semantics has this arithmetic interpretation, we might entertain the thought that there is some counterpart in classical logic to the Boolean Fibonacci. Consider, then, an infinite sequence of statements, each one of which reads 'Both of the next two statements are not true'. We shall call this the Fibber2acci sequence (the '2' is there as a reminder that each member says something about the next two statements). Let 'S i ' abbreviate the name of the ith statement in the sequence. Now construct a value table for the sequence (I show only the first five rows):
The first point to note is that, where any statement S i has the value 0 (i.e., 'true') this requires that both S i+1 and S i+2 are not true; both have value 1. Further, since, under 
The Yablo sequence
For a more far-reaching conclusion, we now turn to Yablo's sequence of sentences. It is a total foresight sequence, since each of the constituent sentences is about all of the subsequent ones: is a class of functions {f: N N | f(n) = f(n-2) + f(n-1)}, no particular series but only the characterization of a generic series. Without the specification of values for at least two members, there is no grounding; no particular series is specified. Now, the Yablo sequence is a counterpart of the total foresight variant of the reverse Fibonacci -any member of the sequence purports to say something about all the subsequent members. The truth-value of any member of this sequence, if grounded, is grounded on the truth-values of subsequent members, since it asserts the untruth of each of them. But the truth-value of each of these is, in turn, inherited from the truth-values of members subsequent to it. Since there is nothing that fixes the truth-value of any member of the sequence, the reasonable conclusion to draw is that no member of the Yablo sequence has a truth-value 3 (or that each has the value 'undefined' or 'GAP' 4 ), just as no member of our underspecified (generic) Fibonacci has a numerical value.
One could write out the standard Fibonacci series in the following way:
The sum of the two preceding numbers
The sum of the two preceding numbers 'calls' itself a number. The natural numbers can be defined by the Peano axioms, and it is an immediate consequence of those axioms that no number can be its own successor. Equally clearly, though containing the words 'the statement', there is no statement designated by the phrase 'The statement that is true if an only if it is false'. This is because it is definitional of 'statement' that no statement is both true and false. 6 A way of seeing that the Strengthened Liar sentence fails to make any statement is as follows: Take 'J' to be the name of some statement. Then the statement 'J is not true'
obviously has a truth-value different from (classically: opposite to) that of J. Therefore by (contraposition of) the law of the identity of indiscernibles, we cannot identify J with 'J is not true'; no such stipulation is admissible. The letter 'J' was, of course, arbitrarily chosen. The conclusion we just drew can be formulated without the use of any particular letter -it is the conclusion that no statement can state of itself that it is not true. So, initial appearances to the contrary, 'This statement is not true' (where the indexical, in this version, assumes the reference-fixing function of the label) is not a statement; it states nothing; in particular, it does not state that it is not true.
There are therefore restrictions on the labeling of statements.
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The Liar is the simplest member of a large family of paradoxes, and it is easy to see, on a case-by-case basis, how the exposure of illegitimate labeling (or, as we shall see below, of other devices that achieve the same effect) dissolves these paradoxes. Consider the Card Paradox in which on one side of a card is written 'What is on the other side of this card is false' while what is written on the other side is 'What is on the other side of this card is true'. This paradox is often discussed in its 'label' variant:
(1) S 1 : S 2 is false.
(2) S 2 : S 1 is true.
(The A/B paradox discussed below is the truth-teller version of this.) We can legitimately assign the name 'S 1 ' to the statement 'S 2 is false' but, in so doing, we are stipulating that S 1 and S 2 have opposite truth-values. Therefore, we are not free, in the same context, to assign the name 'S 2 ' to 'S 1 is true', for that stipulation would guarantee that S 1 and S 2 have the same truth-value. There is thus a restriction on what we can stipulate concerning the names 'S 1 '
and 'S 2 ' once the initial stipulation that 'S 1 ' is to be the name of 'S 2 is false' has been made.
Another way of putting this would be to say that, after the initial assignment has been made, the names 'S 1 ' and 'S 2 ' are no longer free for indiscriminate use, if logical perspicuity is to be respected. This is not an ad hoc restriction, but a familiar one, the rationale for which is well understood. For example, in a natural deduction, we may make an inference from an existentially quantified proposition '(∃x)( …x….)' by instantiating the variable with a name.
But then that name is no longer free for use as a substituend elsewhere in the deduction. A Social Security number, once assigned to someone, is not free for assigning to anybody else.
To see why it is reasonable to claim that both S 1 and S 2 lack content and fail to have any truth-value, one need only reflect that, since no independent information is given about their content, it has to be ascertained from the pair of sentences alone. Questions may be raised, and answered, about the physical makeup of S 1 and S 2 qua inscriptions, or of the language in which S 1 and S 2 are framed. But it becomes clear that the question of the content of S 1 and S 2 is unanswerable. To specify their content one needs to set out the conditions under which they are true, and, as we shall see in section 5, this cannot be done.
To label a statement is to give a name to something that has a certain truth-value.
Where there is a set of statements, each statement about some of the other statements in the set, the fact that a given statement has a certain truth-value will have consequences, sometimes tricky to track, for the truth-values of the other statements. If consistency is to be preserved, it may not be legitimate, as we have seen, to stipulate a certain label for a given statement. The Yablo sequence, as we have retailed it here, consists of a list of labeled sentences. Such a system of labeling produces an illegitimate stipulation; the case is no different in principle from the Liar and the Card paradoxes just considered, but the illegitimacy of the labeling is better disguised.
It is perfectly clear, however, that Yablo's paradox can be recast in a label-free form.
There is the indexical variant -an infinite queue of people each of whom says 'What every person behind me is saying is untrue'. Quantifiers too are indexical; the extension of the phrase 'all the people in Room 101' varies from one occasion of use to another. In a quantificational variant of the simple Liar, the sentence 'All the statements on this board are false' is the only sentence appearing on the board in question. A quantificational variant of the Card Paradox consists of a pair of tokens written on an otherwise empty board thus:
All statements on this board are false.
All statements on this board are true.
Therefore an adequate cure for the Liar's ills must be more general than a diagnosis of 'illegitimate labeling'.
We can consistently claim that, in this scenario, neither of the sentences yields a statement, while recognizing that if (say) the sentence '2 + 2 = 4' were written below them on the board, then, in this new context, each of the sentences would yield a statement, the top two false. It is worth pausing here to say something about the bearers of truth and falsity. Up to this point, we have been calling them 'statements' and the preceding example illustrates why it is not tokens qua physical entities that are the bearers of truth. Before the addition of The next statement is false.
The next statement is false.
Pigs can fly.
Clearly the first two statements, though constructed from the same type-sentence, differ in truth-value, so the bearers of truth cannot be type sentences. A statement is made by the use in a context of a token sentence (although a token of some grammatically acceptable sentence may fail, in a given context, to yield a statement); a statement is what is said by the use of a token on an occasion, and it is statements so construed (some philosophers call them 'propositions') that are the bearers of truth and falsity.
Chains and cycles
A recurrent infinite chain paradox, i.e. a chain paradox containing infinitely repeated chunks, can be transformed into a finite paradox by snipping a representative chunk of the chain and forming a loop by bringing the two ends together (Goldstein 1999 content. Their lack of content may not be immediately apparent; similarly, it may take a few moments' thought to realize that the meaningful expression 'the successor of the integer denoted by this phrase' necessarily fails to denote.
In the light of the distinction between sentence and statement, on which we have been relying, the usual 'true / false / neither' trichotomy is best replaced, for the sake of perspicuity, by 'yields a true statement / yields a false statement / fails to yield a statement', predicable of token sentences relative to the contexts in which they are used. We have said that token sentences are the vehicles for statements; that we typically use token sentences to make statements, and that it is the statements so made that have content and truth-value. But there are occasions when, though we go through the motions of making a statement, no statement results (just as we can go through the motions of making a 'phone call but, when the number dialed is our own, no 'phone call results Yablo's paradox. In fact, the Community Cretin paradox is just the non-exclusionary variant of the Cyclical Fibbernacci (the G-cycle set out above), and the latter, as we saw, is the general cyclical version of Yablo's paradox. Compare a sentence in the Q-cycle (below), which is a formal version of the Community Cretin, with a sentence in the G-cycle.
Q 1 : For all integers i ( 1 i n), Q i is not true.
For all integers i ( 1 i n), Q i is not true.
……………………………………………….
……………………………………………….
Q n : For all integers i ( 1 i n), Q i is not true.
It is easy to see that no truth-value can be consistently assigned to any of the Q i . The tightest Q-cycle (n=1) is simply the Strengthened Liar paradox. The tightest G-cycle, the Fibber1acci, is the strengthened version of Buridan's Sophism 8 (Hughes 1982 Bradwardine (whose writings give no indication that they had given the view the serious attention that it merits). As P.V. Spade (1987) has documented, the proposed solution had virtually died out by the first quarter of the thirteenth century. According to the cassantes, attempted uses of paradoxical sentences to make statements are nullified, so that, although such sentences have meaning, no proposition or content gets to be expressed by them, and hence they lack truth-value.) It is important first to note that the distinction between a meaningful uttered sentence, and the proposition that a token sentence is used to express (or the statement that it makes)
The avoidance of revenge
can be explained quite independently of any considerations about paradox. Think of a footpath, made of pebbles that each day get squished and squirted and scattered by the feet of innumerable walkers. Suppose that, at the end of one day, some pebbles, quite by chance, have ended up looking like a string of letters forming the sentence 'My brother is a doctor'.
It would obviously be lunacy to ask 'Which brother are those pebbles talking about?' or 'By 'doctor' do they mean a physician or someone who has earned a Ph.D.?' By contrast, when I say to an injured companion 'My brother is a doctor', I am talking about my brother Hugh;
by 'doctor' I mean, on this occasion, 'physician', by the sound 'is' I mean the present tense of the verb 'to be', not the 'is' of identity, and by 'a' the indefinite article. 10 The words 'my' 'brother' 'is' 'a' 'doctor' in that order, no more constitute a unified proposition than do those words arranged in any other order. There is a categorical difference between sentence and statement or proposition.
Now consider the sentence 'The next statement is true'. As we saw in Section 3, considered simply as a set of marks, that token no more says anything than do the pebbles. If uttered, with appropriate intentions, by someone, then the resulting locution has some semantical properties, including speaker-meaning, but obviously it acquires the semantical property of having a truth-value only when the relevant next statement is made, for it inherits its truth-value from that latter statement. It would be ridiculous, before that time, to declare that a true statement had been made by the use of that sentence. Or a false one. There are no grounds for so declaring. Similarly, there is no temptation to suppose that any numerical values can be assigned in the generic forward-looking Fibonacci:
The sum of the numbers denoted by the following two noun-phrases
The sum of the numbers denoted by the following two noun-phrases ………………………………………………………………………..
………………………………………………………………………..
for, looking into the infinite beyond, there are no numbers designated, hence no two consecutive ones that can be summed.
Yet, while all reasonable people are quite happy to say that each member of the generic forward-looking Fibonacci series is a description that fails to describe any number, many may yet be reluctant to say that, in the corresponding Fibber2acci series (each member of which is 'Both of the next two statements are not true'), each member fails to make a statement. The difference seems to be that we are familiar with the phenomenon of expressions that fail to designate numbers (e.g. 'the real roots of'x 2 + x + 1 = 0'), but, in the case of the Fibber2acci, each member seems to be saying something about the next two members and they are right there, just below it on the page, so it seems obvious that each member succeeds in making a statement. This appears to be even clearer if we formulate the Fibber2acci in such a way that reference is made only to sentences, viz., when each member is 'The following two sentences yield statements both of which are untrue'. In fact, Yablo's sequence can be expressed in a way tailor-made to resist the cassationist solution advocated here:
YS 1 : For all integers n>1, YS n either yields a falsehood or fails to make a statement.
YS 2 : For all integers n>2, YS n either yields a falsehood or fails to make a statement.
YS 3 : For all integers n>3, YS n either yields a falsehood or fails to make a statement.
…………………………………………………………………………….
……………………………………………………………………………..
We can consistently assign 'yields a truth' to YS 1 , and 'fails to make a statement' (aliter:
'does not possess a truth-value') to all the subsequent YS i . This blocks the reasoning to a contradiction, for if YS 2 fails to make a statement, then, of course, it does not make any truthvalue ascriptions to any of the members of the sequence subsequent to it; in particular it can make none that would be inconsistent with the values assigned to those members on the assumption that YS 1 yields a truth.
Yet this is not a satisfying way with this strengthened version of Yablo's paradox.
The first point to note is that this ascription of values almost entirely cedes the game to the cassationist, since all but one of the sentences in the Yablo sequence is acknowledged to yield no statement. But, further, considerations of symmetry militate against even this ascription of values to members of this sequence. For one could equally and consistently posit that YS 217 yields a truth while all other members of the sequence lack truth-value. But clearly it is quite implausible to suggest that YS 217 yields a truth while YS 218 lacks a truth-value. No, for the Yablo sequence, the only reasonable assignment is 'lacks a truth-value' to all of its members.
The YS version of the Yablo paradox fails to wreak revenge on the cassationist solution.
Although the revenge problem can be defeated by denying truth-value to any of the YS i , the victory is Pyrrhic unless we can explain why a sentence that looks, for all the world, as if it is being used to make a statement nevertheless fails to yield one. There is a real tension here. As we saw with the Fibber2acci sequence, all of its members have meaning and classical truth-values can be assigned to all of them, every 'true' followed by two 'false's.
Yet, in a perfectly clear sense, every member of the infinite sequence makes the same claim and therefore they ought not to differ in truth-value, and this pulls us in the direction of holding (what Wittgenstein held in the case of tautologies and contradictions (1922, 5.43; see also 4.461, 6.11) ) that they all say the same, namely nothing and hence are without truthvalue. This same tension arises for each of the family of paradoxes that we have been discussing. For example (to take the simplest) the Truth-Teller T: T yields a true statement.
One could assign 'yields a truth' to T, but equally, one could assign 'yields a falsehood', so it may seem reasonable to suppose that T has a classical truth-value. But (especially in view of the fact that one cannot in a non-circular way say just what statement T yields), that there is no more reason to say that it is true than that it is false, pulls one in the direction of saying that it is without truth-value.
The resolution of this difficulty lies in reflecting that we typically state the truthconditions of a statement by means of a biconditional. Biconditionals are also frequently used for stating the rules of a game. Thus: 'A penalty point is awarded to a player iff his or her opponent intentionally impedes access to the ball'. Guided by such rules, a referee is able to adjudicate. Clearly the following biconditional would offer no guidance at all: 'A penalty is awarded to a player iff a penalty is awarded to a player'. I shall call such biconditionals vacuous, for the RHS fails to state any condition under which the LHS holds. For a given token sentence named 'N', the truth-conditions of the statement yielded by N are supplied by the biconditional scheme:
N yields a true statement iff w.
where 'w' abbreviates a token sentence typically of the same type as the one named 'N' or of a translation thereof. 11 Therefore, in attempting to give the truth-conditions for the truth-teller T we obtain, by substitution of T for N in the above scheme T yields a true statement iff T yields a true statement.
a vacuous biconditional which fails to supply any truth-conditions for a use of T. But, as Mark Sainsbury points out, '[t] o contemplate an appropriate concatenation of words with understanding is to appreciate its truth-condition. There is no unanswered question about how the sentence manages to say something' (Sainsbury 1996, p.147) . The point can be put like this: being a statement involves having a truth-condition. Now, as we have just seen, no nonempty truth-condition can be given for a use of T; it suffers from what, in Section 3, we termed 'underspecification'. Hence T fails to yield a statement.
Vacuity of the sort that we have been discussing afflicts other members of the Liar family in which no direct self-reference occurs. Consider the pair A: B yields a truth.
B: A yields a truth.
The truth-condition for A (if it had one) would be A yields a truth iff B yields a truth.
And the truth-condition for B (if it had one) would be B yields a truth iff A yields a truth.
Solving these two biconditionals for A by transitivity gives the vacuous A yields a truth iff A yields a truth.
so we conclude that A lacks content, delivers no truth-value, and so, likewise, does B.
G.E. Moore's 'Paradox of Analysis' can be read as a warning that giving a plausible general account of what makes an analytically true biconditional informative (non-vacuous) is going to be a non-trivial task. The above examples, however seem to be uncontroversial cases of vacuity: the meaning of a word is not explained merely by repeating that word; the truth-condition of an utterance cannot be given by announcing that it is true on condition that….it is true. Perhaps, so it may be objected, there are ways of specifying the content of an utterance other than by stating its truth-conditions. A child may come to understand the content of the assertion 'Here are five red apples', for example, by observing how competent speakers interact with the world, how they interweave a variety of actions when using those words to make that assertion (Wittgenstein 1953, § § 1, 7) . But there is nothing in or about the extra-linguistic world that discloses a content for T, A, or B.
Less argument is needed in the case of paradoxes that are not truth-teller variants.
Here, again, there is failure of specification, but of an even more pernicious kind. The following is surely a spectacularly flawed attempt to deliver a viable rule of squash: 'A let ball is awarded to a player iff a let ball is not awarded to a player'. Obviously, this 'rule' is empty and can offer no guidance to a referee. A 'rule' that cannot regulate is no rule.
Likewise, there are 'definitions' that do not succeed in defining. The sentence 'Iens' can be a successful definition of 'Iendum' only if 'Iendum iff Iens' is true. But S yields a true statement iff S does not yield a true statement.
is obviously not true. Therefore, by the same train of reasoning as we employed in the discussion of T, no truth-condition can be given for a use of the Strengthened Liar S: S does not yield a true statement.
for the attempt to do so (above) is a biconditional that is not true. Hence the Strengthened Liar S fails to yield a statement and thus lacks a truth-value. I can say that, using a token (C) 'S does not yield a true statement', and the truth-condition of C is C yields a true statement iff S does not yield a true statement
Since, as we have argued, S does not yield a true statement, C does.
J.L. Austin wrote that the Truth-teller is 'every bit as absurd' as the Liar (Austin 1950, p.122) . But one might well be inclined to say that the Liar is even more absurd than the Truth-teller because its truth-conditions are not just vacuous but also visibly impossible to Standing outside the sequence, we can use a token of the sentence 'For all integers n>1, Y n is not true.' to say something true, even though the equiform Y 1 fails to state anything. cases in the semantical paradoxes we have been considering. For example, no paradox would arise from Epimenides saying 'All Cretans except myself are total liars'.) In the set theoretical paradoxes, membership conditions cannot be formulated non-vacuously; in the semantical paradoxes, truth conditions cannot be formulated non-vacuously. Herein lies the deep similarity between these two families of paradox. The sets and the statements we thought we were dealing with are irredeemably ill-defined and so do not exist. 
Set-theoretic paradoxes
